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VII. Becoming Worthy of What Happens to Us: 
Art and Subjectivity in the Philosophy of
Gilles Deleuze 
Kasper Levin 
Roskilde University 
Aesthetics traditionally lends itself to a double meaning. On the one 
hand, it is often referred to as a theory of art by which we can reflect 
on our experiences with different material forms of expression; on the 
other hand, aesthetics also refers to a more general theory of sensibil-
ity, as the fundamental ground for subjective experience. In the con-
text of this book’s themes of art and identity, aesthetic dualism is cen-
tral, because it immediately forces us to presuppose, in the analysis of 
the role of art, a separation of the subjective level of experience and 
the objective conditions for experience, as such. 
       Philosophically, aesthetic dualism goes back to Immanuel Kant’s 
distinction between the analysis of a transcendental aesthetic (Kant 
1781) and aesthetic judgment (Kant 1790). However, due to the per-
vasiveness of Kantian thought aesthetic dualism does not restrict itself 
to the realm of philosophical aesthetics. This dualism leads to a com-
mon claim inherent in many approaches to art: that works of art must 
be considered as representations, expressing or signifying an identity 
underlying human subjectivity.
       To name a few generalized examples, in psychoanalysis aesthetic 
dualism is inherent in the understanding of artworks as representa-
tions of unconscious objects or desires (e.g., Freud 1910; Segal 1952; 
Wollheim 1987). In neuropsychology the aesthetic dualism is inherent 
in the claim that art represents neural laws of the brain (Zeki 2004), 
and in phenomenology it is inherent in the conception of art as a rep-
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resentation of the intentionality of subjective experience (e.g., 
Ingarden 1965). In other words, subjectivity is presupposed in the 
understanding of art. Though many exponents of various disciplines in 
philosophy and psychology emphasize the significance of art to sub-
jectivity, most often the model of art as a representation or reflection 
of the world reduces art to an appendix to subjective thought. 
       From my point of view, the presupposition of a subjective identity 
as a primary condition in art is problematic because it reduces the 
genuinely creative or productive relationship between art and subjec-
tivity to an instance of representation, reference, or reproduction. By 
presupposing subjectivity in the understanding of art, the productions 
in art are subjugated to general categories of subjective thought, re-
ducing art to a reflection of thought rather than a production of it. In 
my view, this perspective remains blind to the role of art as a genetic 
or productive force in subjectivity.
       The intensive engagement with art and aesthetics in the works of 
the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze is often portrayed as a means 
of dissolution or a fundamental break with the discourse on subjectivi-
ty in both its psychological and philosophical expositions. According 
to Deleuze, what is central to art is not an exploration of emotions or 
representations of a world of perceptions, but rather the production of 
sensations as the genetic principle immanent to subjectivity. The 
claim that art does not represent, but rather creates or expands the 
world we experience through sensations, means that the question of 
‘art’ and ‘identity’ is not an apprehension of a harmonious accord 
between the subjective being and art, but rather an expression of a 
fundamental dissension or rift. Thus, through the function of art we 
are constantly reminded that the subjective acts of thinking, feeling, 
seeing, or hearing cannot be presupposed. As Deleuze argued, we do 
not experience art but we become subjectivities through it. Often this 
radical aesthetic element of Deleuze’s philosophy is reduced to a de-
structive dismantling of personal identity, exposing the contradictory 
elements and internal oppositions of subjectivity. 
       Indeed, a genuinely non-human element of thought, beyond the 
established notions of subjectivity and identity, does constitute a cen-
tral force in Deleuze’s approach to art. However, as I suggest, his 
radical dismantling of subjectivity through art should not be consid-
ered as the end of subjectivity, but rather as an opening up of a crea-
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tive domain in our constant involvement with the production of sub-
jectivity as a way of organizing thought. 
      Deleuze’s famous notion of the ‘Body without Organs’ (taken 
from the French poet Antonin Artaud) as the means of escaping the 
subjective organization of thought, is perhaps the most renowned ex-
ample of a radical non-human element in his thinking related to a spe-
cific work of art. However, this notion must not be misunderstood as a 
rejection of the subjective element in art. On the contrary, the dissolu-
tion of subjectivity in Deleuze’s philosophy is always immanent to a 
productive endeavor, a launching of new organizations of thought. It 
is in this context that Deleuze calls for a will to listen to and learn 
from art. As I shall argue, what is produced in Deleuze’s writings is 
not a negative rejection of subjectivity, but an affirmation of life 
through art. It is this affirmative openness or will to learn from works 
of art that makes Deleuze’s approach to the relation between art and 
subjectivity a unique attempt to place art at the center of thought. 
Nevertheless, this rather existential perspective in Deleuze’s work is 
often ignored. 
      By following a trajectory from Deleuze’s critique of Kantian aes-
thetics and his own aesthetic notion of a transcendental empiricism to 
his influential engagement with the works of the painter Francis Ba-
con and the writer Marcel Proust, I will analyze Deleuze’s work as an 
exemplary case of placing art at center of thought and consequently at 
the core of subjectivity. 
1.  The Reversal of Kantian Aesthetics  
Philosophically, the question of subjectivity and art in Deleuze’s work 
is closely related to a rigorous rethinking of the relationship between 
sensation and thought, which makes aesthetics a central topic of his 
writings. As seen in his reading of Kant, what Deleuze is pushing for 
is the possibility of uniting the duality between the theory of sensibil-
ity as the form of possible experience (i.e., the transcendental aesthet-
ics) and the theory of art as reflection of real experience (i.e., aesthetic 
judgment) (Smith 1996). On the one hand, the a priori forms of space 
and time constitute the conditions for the possibility of our experience 
and cognition, as such (the transcendental aesthetic in Kritik der 
Reinen Vernunft [1781]); on the other hand, aesthetic judgments based 
on the feelings of pleasure and pain are subjective and hold no imme-
diate universal validity. Thus, in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, the 
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relationship between sensation and thought is approached dualistical-
ly. In Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790), one of the challenges for Kant is 
how to account for the possibility of universal principles for aesthetic 
experiences. Kant’s answer is based on a presupposition of a universal 
relationship between the faculties of cognition.
      While the transcendental aesthetic forms the necessary condition 
for the given object and the universal possibility of objective experi-
ence, the universal principle of aesthetic judgment, as the subjective 
reflection on real experience, is what Kant calls a ‘sensus communis 
aestheticus,’ or aesthetic common sense. In Deleuze’s reading of 
Kant’s aesthetics, the presupposition of common sense represents 
what he calls a “dogmatic image of thought” that must be overcome to 
reveal the real relationship between sensation and thought. 
2.  Critique of the Aesthetics of Common Sense 
According to Kant, the external senses of the subject are passive re-
ceivers of intuitions of a given object, and the recognition of a sensed 
object presupposes an active synthesis or accordance of the internal 
faculties: understanding, reason, and imagination. Each faculty has its 
own way of acting toward a given object, but in order to recognize an 
object a faculty must find its given object identical to that of another: 
the object that can be sensed must be identical to what can be imag-
ined, remembered, conceived, etc. The synthesis of an intuited object 
of sensation and the cognitive faculties is possible due to the imagina-
tion’s creation of a transcendental schema combining the formless 
manifold of sensuous intuitions according to the a priori concepts or 
categories. The result of the different faculties’ total relation to the 
transcendental form of a given object is what Kant refers to as ‘sensus 
communis,’ which is not to be understood as a common understanding 
or a psychological disposition but as the universal condition for our 
judgments.
      In logical scientific judgment and practical moral judgment, the 
schematization of the imagination is legislated respectively by the 
concepts of understanding and reason as the pure form of desire. Aes-
thetic judgment, however, is described by Kant as a result of the effect 
of the subjective common sense, which does not mean a psychological 
or empirical “outer sense, but [...] the effect arising from the free play 
of our powers of cognition” (Kant 1790/1987: 87). Because the aes-
thetic common sense is a free accord of the cognitive faculties—
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meaning that neither understanding nor reason has legislative power—
aesthetic judgment cannot be determined by a concept, but remains 
the subjective feeling of pleasure or pain. This is also why Kant de-
scribed aesthetic pleasure as disinterested, since it is neither guided by 
a speculative or practical interest. However, this does not imply that 
the imagination is independent from understanding in aesthetic judg-
ments of the beautiful: 
Only where the imagination is free when it arouses the understanding, and 
the understanding, without using concepts, puts the imagination into a play 
that is regular [i.e., manifests regularity], does the presentation communicate 
itself not as thought but as the inner feeling of a purposive state of mind. 
(Kant 1790/1987: 162) 
In other words, the feeling of pleasure related to an aesthetic judgment 
of beauty is not produced by the empirical or sensuous encounter with 
an object, but is the effect of the pure representation of a universal 
subjective state of mind. In this way, the common sense also desig-
nates the result of an a priori unity of the cognitive faculties, without 
which knowledge would not be communicable and universal. When 
we feel pleasure from experiencing a beautiful piece of music or a 
painting, we assume, in principle, that our pleasure is communicable 
to everyone through the universal identity of subjectivity. Similarly, 
when we say that a work of art is beautiful, the objectivity we claim is 
not related to the conditions to which an object must be subject, but to 
the mere reflection of an inner harmony or free accord between the 
faculties as the condition for subjectivity, as such. As a universal prin-
ciple for the subjective judgment and synthesis of knowledge, com-
mon sense is also what relates the transcendental conditions for the 
true, the good, and the beautiful in Kant’s philosophy.
      In this way, aesthetic experiences and works of art are described 
as acts of recognition and representation in the subjective relation 
between sensation and thought. This relationship not only presupposes 
an objective identity given to the faculties as recognition (i.e., tran-
scendental aesthetic), but also an identity of the subject that unites the 
faculties in a harmonious accord in the effect of common sense (i.e., 
aesthetic judgment). In different terms, the a priori common sense in 
Kant presupposes an accord between the unity of the consciousness 
and the wholeness of the object. Deleuze questioned this assumption 
and asked: 
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[Is] it sufficient to assume this free accord, to suppose it a priori? Must it not 
be, on the contrary, produced in us? That is to say: should aesthetic common 
sense not be the object of a genesis, of a properly transcendental genesis? 
(1963/1984: 50) 
As Deleuze pointed out, Kant’s aesthetics of beauty does not leave 
room for a genetic or creative element in the relations between sensa-
tion and thought. The presumption of recognition as a ground for the 
external relations of thought reduces the act of thinking to a question 
of representation of the already given. Kant described the spatio-
temporal relations in the schema of the imagination, which connects 
passive sensuous intuitions to the active faculties, as a mystery, or “an 
art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of 
activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover” (Kant 
1781/1929: 183). In Kantian aesthetics of beauty, encounters with 
works of art remain cognitive representations of an already given 
harmony which is never explained but must be assumed.
     According to Deleuze, however, the presupposition of a common 
sense as ground for the aesthetic experience presents a problem in 
terms of explaining the reproduction of sensuous intuitions by the 
imagination, because the common sense necessarily presupposes an 
inaccessible or hidden external harmony in sensible nature which 
makes possible the identification or recognition of concepts. As a 
result, intuition and concept—and, consequently, sensation and 
thought—constitute a problematic duality in the Kantian system, 
which does not account for aesthetics or sensation as genetic or crea-
tive elements of thought.
     In his early main work, Différence et Répétition, Deleuze wrote: 
Such a duality refers us back to the extrinsic criterion of constructability and 
leaves us with an external relation between the determinable (Kantian space 
as pure given) and the determination (the concept in so far as it is thought). 
(1968/2004: 220) 
Kant’s internalization of the subject-object relation in the pre-
supposed common sense is based on an assumption of an already giv-
en identity of the subject, and remains blind to this external difference 
between what is determinable in thought and the act of thinking in 
determinant concepts. For Kant, difference remains empirical and, as 
such, suspended outside the transcendental relations of the faculties 
and unobtainable by the ideas of reason. The schematism of the imag-
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ination therefore neither legislates nor creates the harmony between 
intuition and concept, but merely adapts and reproduces it under the 
given accord between concepts of understanding and ideas of pure 
reason. On this account, Deleuze accused Kant of reducing the tran-
scendental—that is, the conditions of possibility—to a question of 
adapting to or reproducing an already given aesthetic common sense. 
“In so far as the practical finality of recognition lies in the “estab-
lished values”, then on this model the whole image of thought as Cog-
itatio natura bears witness to a disturbing complacency” (171). 
Deleuze objected to an image of thought based on “the idea of a good 
nature of the faculties” (Deleuze 1963/1984: 21) and to the act of 
thinking as a natural or voluntary exercise that formally leads to truth. 
Like Friedrich Nietzsche, Deleuze criticized Kant for leaving out the 
question of values in his critical project, and pointed to the model of 
recognition in the common sense as a dogmatic image of thought, 
blind to its own origin in the already established. This becomes par-
ticularly apparent in the judgment of beauty, because the harmony 
cannot be ascribed to a legislating faculty, but must be assumed in-
stead as a disinterested reflection of a universally well-proportioned 
subjectivity a priori. Kant’s aesthetics remains dualistic, separating 
the objective conditions of possibility exposed in the transcendental 
aesthetic from the subjective feeling involved in aesthetic judgment. 
      In Kant’s theory of the sublime, however, Deleuze found an open-
ing toward another basis for aesthetics that goes beyond the presuppo-
sition of subjective identity, representation, and recognition. 
3.  The Sublime: Toward a Genetic Principle of Aesthetics 
Kant simply described the sublime as large in its absolute sense or 
“large beyond all comparison” (1790/1987: 103). The sublime denotes 
the wholeness that through its magnitude is not available to the recon-
struction of the faculties. Contrary to the experience of beauty 
grounded in the higher pleasure of the free and indeterminate harmo-
ny, the experience of the sublime is grounded in an unpleasurable 
inadequacy of the faculties due to the limited powers of the imagina-
tion. The precondition for the experience of aesthetic magnitude is, on 
the one hand, the apprehension (“apprehensio”) of the imagination—
the inner partial presentations from the manifold or formless sensuous 
intuition—and, on the other hand, the simultaneous comprehension 
(“comprehensio aesthetica”) of the successively apprehended parts, 
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the mental grasping of the manifold over time in a representation of a 
unity of intuition. But the encounter with the whole of an absolute 
magnitude creates problems in this progressive synthesis. 
Apprehension involves no problem, for it may progress to infinity. But com-
prehension becomes more and more difficult the farther apprehension pro-
gresses, and it soon reaches its maximum, namely, the aesthetically largest 
basic measure for an estimation of magnitude. (Kant 1790/1987: 108) 
Our comprehension, Kant argued, has a limited range beyond which 
representation of the progression of parts apprehended becomes im-
possible to imagine. The foundation for aesthetic experience of the 
sublime is a feeling of unpleasure due to this inadequacy of the power 
of the imagination. Only the experience of “crude nature” in its in-
comprehensible magnitude serves as an appropriate example of the 
sublime. Faced with the immensity of nature’s formless, absolute 
magnitude the imagination reaches its own limit. The comprehension 
of any appearance in the absolute whole of intuition is imposed on us 
from the law of reason, “which knows no other determinate measure 
that is valid for everyone and unchanging than the absolute whole” 
(114).
      So, while the feeling of the beautiful represents a harmony be-
tween the faculties of understanding and imagination, the feeling of 
the sublime expresses a dissension between the demands of reason 
and the power of imagination. In other words, the sublime denotes the 
impossibility of an accord between imagination and reason in the 
comprehension of the rational idea of sensible nature as an infinite or 
absolute whole. Thus, the unpleasurable inadequacy in the sublime 
reflects the inaccessibility of the absolute rational ideas to the sensu-
ously dependent imagination. It is not a psychological discrepancy, 
but an inadequacy in sensible nature, as such, or what Kant described 
as an encounter with a “supersensible substrate” (Kant 1790/1987: 
112). Nevertheless, the feeling of the sublime is associated with a 
certain transcendental genesis or creation. 
In order for the mind to be attuned to the feeling of the sublime, it must be 
receptive to ideas. For it is precisely nature’s inadequacy to the ideas—and 
this presupposes both that the mind is receptive to ideas and that the imagina-
tion strains to treat nature as a schema for them—that constitutes what both 
repels our sensibility and yet attracts us at the same time, because it is a dom-
inance [Gewalt] that reason exerts over sensibility only for the sake of ex-
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panding it commensurately with reason’s own domain (the practical one) and 
letting it look outward toward the infinite, which for sensibility is an abyss. 
(Kant 1790/1987: 124) 
Like common sense in the judgment of beauty, the sublime is founded 
on subjective principles. But the feeling of the sublime more urgently 
requires a genetic principle that is associated with the creation or de-
velopment of a culture. This does not mean that the sublime is some-
thing produced by culture or imposed by society; it is, rather, the natu-
ral capacity for a feeling for (practical) ideas, a moral sense that marks 
the fundamental relationship between nature, man, and the creation of 
a culture. The subjective feeling of the sublime is not connected to 
truth as an abstract idea, but rather to the practical destination of our 
faculties as moral beings. In this way, the discord or dissension be-
tween imagination and reason—the precondition for the sublime—is 
also the genesis of a new harmony.
For though the imagination finds nothing beyond the sensible that could sup-
port it, this very removal of its barriers also makes it feel unbounded, so that 
its separation [from the sensible] is an exhibition of the infinite; and though 
an exhibition of the infinite can as such never be more than merely negative, 
it still expands the soul (Kant 1790/1987: 135). 
Confronted with its own limit by the demands of reason, the imagina-
tion goes beyond this limit in the sense that it presents to itself the fact 
that there is something in sensible nature that cannot be represented in 
imagination. Empirically the sublime is inaccessible to the faculties, 
but expresses itself as a transcendental engendering of the genuinely 
new, or, rather, that which can only be imagined. In this way, “[t]he 
sense of the sublime is engendered within us in such a way that it pre-
pares us for the advent of the moral law” (Deleuze 1963/1984: 52). In 
other words, the analysis of the sublime introduces a final discordant 
harmony between the faculties that is not presupposed, but is the re-
sult of a transcendental and creative exercise of the faculties. By in-
troducing this element of creativity into his system, Deleuze argued, 
Kant managed to go beyond the dogmatic image of thought toward a 
genetic principle of aesthetics. 
      However, since the essence of Kant’s philosophical system, run-
ning through his three major critiques, is still founded predominantly 
on the dogmatic model of recognition and common sense as a given 
identity in the relation between the transcendental and the empirical, 
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“it can be said that Kant’s critical revolution changes nothing essen-
tial” (Deleuze and Guattari 1972/1983: 48). But as Deleuze pointed 
out, the analysis of the sublime presents a form of thinking fundamen-
tally different from the dogmatic image of thought. The analysis of the 
sublime in Kritik der Urteilskraft is an opening toward a genetic rela-
tion between sensation and thought. On this basis, Deleuze interpreted 
Kant’s third critique as the genetic foundation for the previous two, 
since it “uncovers a deeper free and indeterminate accord of the facul-
ties as the condition of the possibility of every determinate relation-
ship” (Deleuze 1963/1984: 68). Through this reversal of Kant, 
Deleuze suggested that the element of sensation is not preconditioned 
by a priori common sense or cognitive recognition, but is rather the 
genesis from a fundamental encounter of differential relations be-
tween the faculties. From this perspective, Deleuze’s critique of Kant 
also overcomes aesthetic dualism between the aesthetics of possible 
experience and that of real experience, between the transcendental and 
the empirical. It is from this perspective that Deleuze called his posi-
tion transcendental empiricism—an image of thought in which art is 
considered a necessary productive element.
4.  Transcendental Empiricism and Art 
In several texts, Deleuze (1962, 1968, 1972) illustrated the difference 
that separates the dogmatic and the genetic relation between sensation 
and thought by referring to a passage in Plato’s The Republic (c. 380 
B.C) that lays out two different accounts of perception. 
Take our perceptions, then. I can point to some of these which do not pro-
voke thought to reflect upon them, because we are satisfied with the judg-
ment of the senses. But in other cases perception seems to yield no trustwor-
thy result, and reflection is instantly demanded. (Plato c. 380 B.C./1945: 238-
239)
Plato’s description of unprovoked judgments is an example of what 
Deleuze, in relation to Kant’s general analysis of cognition, described 
as a “disturbing complacency” of thought and that he found to be 
dogmatic. But those cases where “reflection is instantly demanded” 
mark the genetic principle of thought, to be found in Kant’s analysis 
of the sublime. On this background, Deleuze described the sublime as 
a fundamental encounter that calls for thinking: 
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Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of 
recognition but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered may be 
Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective 
tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its primary charac-
teristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed to recognition. 
In recognition, the sensible is not at all that which can only be sensed, but 
that which bears directly upon the senses in an object which can be recalled, 
imagined or conceived. (1968/2004: 176) 
The conditions for subjective thought are not to be found in what is 
possible to represent in general, but rather in the real encounters with 
the differential or contradictory elements of sensation—to quote Plato, 
those encounters “when perception yields a contradictory impression, 
presenting two opposite qualities with equal clearness” (239). 
      Contrary to the Kantian image of thought, presupposing the identi-
ty of truth and the good as pre-established recognizable subjective 
givens in aesthetic experience, Deleuze pointed to a fundamental dif-
ference in aesthetic experience as the precondition for every phenom-
enon and production of subjectivity: 
Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which 
the given is given, that by which the given is given as diverse... Every phe-
nomenon refers to an inequality by which it is conditioned. Every diversity 
and every change refers to a difference which is its sufficient reason. Every-
thing which happens and everything which appears is correlated with orders 
of difference: difference of level, temperature, pressure, tension, potential, 
difference of intensity. (1994/1998: 280) 
In this way, no general transcendental conditions of possibilities can 
be given a priori, but must always be the result of a genesis or tran-
scendental production in sensible nature. It is from this perspective 
that Deleuze related his own philosophy to empiricism, not in the tra-
ditional sense as a way of explaining all knowledge as induced by 
experience, but rather empiricism as a question of the production of 
subjectivity. In his book, Empirisme et subjectivité (1953), on the 
philosophy of David Hume, Deleuze criticized the traditional textbook 
definition of empiricism as defined by the Kantian tradition, because it 
mistakenly interprets knowledge as the most important element for 
empiricism. Knowledge, argued Deleuze, 
is not the most important thing for empiricism, but only the means to some 
practical experience... because experience for the empiricist, and for Hume in 
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particular, does not have this univocal and constitutive aspect that we give it. 
(1953/1991: 107-108) 
According to Deleuze’s reading of Hume’s empiricism, human nature 
and subjectivity are not given as such, but are always constituted in 
the given, i.e., in a collection of ideas or in the imagination. As 
Deleuze pointed out, the important questions for empiricism are: “how 
does the mind become a subject? How does the imagination become a 
faculty?” (23). To the empiricist, ideas are not representations of a 
universally given system, but are the result of differential external 
relations in the production of subjectivity. In Hume, Deleuze found 
this in the relationship between atomism of distinct differential ideas 
(nature) and the transcending principles of associationism (human 
nature, subjectivity). Rather than presupposing a privileged harmony 
as a precondition for meaningful and rational representations, Hume 
claimed an atomic structure for our ideas by showing how the idea in 
itself is a complete whole with no reference to other ideas. The rela-
tionship between singular and differential ideas occurs as a result of a 
psychological habit in human nature, not as a result of the way the 
ideas are given in themselves. Hume’s primary example is causality, 
which, according to him, does not refer to the nature of how an idea is 
given in itself, but is rather the result of a habit. In other words, habit 
“determines the imagination to make a transition from the idea of one 
object to that of its usual attendant, and from the impression of one to 
a more lively idea of the other” (Hume 1888/1978: 170). The concept 
‘idea’ should here be understood equivocally as both the sense im-
pression of an object and the linguistic understanding of it. This 
equivocality of the idea makes it possible for the empiricist to insert 
habit and the laws of association as mediating principles between the 
meaningless nature of distinct differential relations and the structure 
of the subjective world of intentionality and meaning (Diderichsen 
2001). Rather than presupposing a given identity represented in ideas, 
empiricism takes its point of departure in the differential relations 
between a nature of meaningless causal associations, on the one side, 
and a meaningful human culture of habits or structure, on the other. 
Between the immediate lifeworld of the thinking subject and the phys-
ical world, empiricism inserts the equivocal nature of human sensation 
as a mediating principle (Diderichsen 2001).  
      Consequently, in Deleuze’s interpretation, the primary question 
for empiricism concerns the genesis of subjectivity, or how the consti-
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tution of a world of meaning and culture is possible on the basis of 
immanent principles in nature. As opposed to Kant’s transcendental 
idealism of common sense, empiricism does not presuppose subjectiv-
ity and the rational structure of the world as a given, but rather seeks 
the conditions of possibility of thought in the chaotic multiplicity of 
relations external to subjective meaning and ideas. “The depth of the 
human mind is indeed delirium, or—same thing from another point of 
view—chance1 and indifference” (Deleuze 1953/1991: 23). In this 
perspective, human subjectivity is constituted as the practical structur-
ing and affecting of the chaotic multiplicity of singular and differen-
tial ideas. On this account, Deleuze considered empiricism to be a 
pluralistic theory of understanding and a critique of representation—in 
essence a thinking that does not suspend or reduce differential rela-
tions to an impure element outside the act of thinking: 
Hume shows that representation cannot be a criterion for the relations. Rela-
tions are not the object of a representation, but the means of an activity. The 
same critique, which takes the relation away from representation, gives it 
back to practice. (1953/1991: 120) 
This is also why the primary object for Hume is not knowledge or 
truth, but rather subjectivity as the unfolding of practical ideas for 
moral, historical, and political questions—“Hume is above all a mor-
alist, a political thinker, and a historian” (Deleuze 1953/1991: 33). It 
is through this interpretation of Hume and empiricism that Deleuze’s 
introduction of the notion of a transcendental empiricism should be 
understood as a pluralistic thinking that does not presuppose general 
ideas of already established external relations as a condition for possi-
ble experience. In this image of thought, aesthetics is not a question of 
identifying the conditions of possibility for a harmonious or sensible 
thought, or the feeling of pleasure related to the reflection of subjec-
tivity; it is, rather, a question of seeking the conditions for thought and 
ideas in the multiplicity of differential relations directly in the sensi-
ble.
It is strange that aesthetics (as the science of the sensible) could be founded 
on what can be represented in the sensible. True, the inverse procedure is not 
                                                           
1 I have corrected a typographical error in the English text, in which the French word 
"hasard" erroneously is translated as “change.”
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much better, consisting of the attempt to withdraw the pure sensible from 
representation and to determine it as that which remains once representation 
is removed... Empiricism truly becomes transcendental, and aesthetics an ap-
odictic discipline, only when we apprehend directly in the sensible that 
which only can be sensed, the very being of the sensible: difference, potential 
difference and difference in intensity as the reason behind qualitative diversi-
ty. (Deleuze 1968/2004: 68) 
Deleuze’s notion of aesthetics is transcendental insofar as its origin is 
not given in a transcendent relation between subject and object, and 
empirical to the extent that it seeks the explanation of ideas in imma-
nent principles given in the multiplicity of differential relations of 
sensation. By not subjugating sensation to a model of representation in 
the sensible, it reveals itself as a necessary quantitative force behind 
the production of subjectivity and in this way aesthetics becomes an 
apodictic or necessary discipline for thought. There are no general 
conditions of possibility for the object of sensation, but only a mutual 
determination of the object in the encounter between contradictory 
forces of sensation.
We will never find the sense of something (of a human, a biological or even 
a physical phenomenon) if we do not know the force which appropriates the 
thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in it. 
(Deleuze 1962/1983: 3) 
Sensation is in itself a symptom of an encounter that gets its meaning 
from the existing dominant forces. The act of thinking is neither re-
flection, nor contemplation, nor representation, but a production of 
forces. Deleuze’s account of the relation between sensation and 
thought resonates heavily with the ontology of Nietzsche and his no-
tion of the ‘will to power’ as a principle for the synthesis of forces (cf. 
Deleuze 1962).  Force is the result of a differential relation or encoun-
ter between opposing forces (i.e., intensities), which are the funda-
mental genetic condition for thought. Like Nietzsche, what Deleuze 
suggested is that objects are expressions of quantitative difference 
conditioned by immanent relations of force. Subjective qualities of 
perception and affection originate and are conditioned by intensities of 
differential relations of sensation. He claimed that “The privilege of 
sensibility as origin appears in the fact that, in an encounter, what 
forces sensation and that which only can be sensed are one and the 
same thing” (Deleuze 1968/2004: 182), and that “[T]he two senses of 
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the aesthetic become one, to the point where the being of the sensible 
reveals itself in the work of art, while at the same time the work of art 
appears as experimentation” (82). In uniting the transcendental aes-
thetics of objectivity and the empirical pluralism in the production of 
subjectivity, the understanding of sensibility must take its point of 
departure in a genealogy of sensation that is not limited to what is 
possible in general. Instead it must seek to expand the limits of subjec-
tive thought. It is in this perspective that art—as the exploration of 
differential forces of intensity—becomes central to the production of 
sensibility and a necessary condition for the act of thinking.
      In my view, Deleuze’s philosophical unification of aesthetics is 
remarkable because it gives us theoretical grounds for considering art 
as a force of production at the center of thought. In this way, the ques-
tion concerning the relationship between art and other disciplines of 
thought also becomes relevant. From this perspective, Deleuze con-
sidered art to be one of the three great forms of thought, along with 
science and philosophy. Art is not defined as more creative or produc-
tive than other forms of thought but differs in terms of what it produc-
es. While philosophy is the production of concepts and science the 
production of referential functions, art is the production of percepts 
and affects and, as such, the exploration of the fundamental encounter 
of differential sensations. In this way, art is considered as experimen-
tation with the chaotic multiplicity of sensation, creating or exposing 
new possibilities for structure, intentionality, and meaning. It does not 
reflect subjectivity but rather produces sensations independent of the 
perception of objects or the perceiving subject. According to Deleuze, 
art is what forces sensation, and is in itself “that which only can be 
sensed” (1968/2004: 182). And if art is what can only be sensed, it 
follows that art, as a production of thought, is independent of philo-
sophical concepts or the referential functions of science. At the same 
time, however, what can only be sensed in art is also a presentation of 
an external condition immanent to something still to be thought as a 
philosophical concept or a scientific function.
      Consequently, while philosophy captures sensation through the 
creation of a language of concepts, science is deeply involved in creat-
ing referential systems that can account for the functions of human 
perception and affection. Conversely, concepts and functions can 
serve as the necessary external conditions immanent to what is pro-
duced or thought as a sensation in art. In this way, Deleuze argued that 
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art, philosophy, and science serve as each others’ external conditions 
immanent to the production of each. As an example, the artist may 
have great interest in, and utilize, the scientific functions of materials 
used in a work of art, but what he creates is only art insofar as it pro-
duces a sensation independent of the scientific functions of its materi-
als. Likewise, the artist may be interested in exploring a philosophical 
concept, but if the exploration does not produce a sensation independ-
ent of the concept, it fails to leave the philosophical plane. 
      So the work of art is not an imaginary representation, reflection, or 
reproduction of any concept or function of subjective sensibility. It 
does not express qualities of already felt or perceived affections and 
perceptions, but is instead a preservation of a more primitive level of 
sensation itself. 
Art preserves, and it is the only thing in the world that is preserved. It pre-
serves and is preserved in itself (quid juris?), although actually it lasts no 
longer than its support and materials—stone, canvas, chemical color, and so 
on (quid facti?). The young girl maintains the pose that she has had for five 
thousand years, a gesture that no longer depends on whoever made it. The air 
still has the turbulence, the gust of wind, and the light that it had that day last 
year, and it no longer depends on whoever was breathing it that morning... 
What is preserved—the thing or the work of art—is a bloc of sensation, that 
is to say, a compound of percepts and affects. Percepts are no longer percep-
tions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them. Affects 
are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who 
undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings whose validity 
lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. They could be said to exist in the 
absence of man because man, as he is caught in stone, on the canvas, or by 
words, is himself a compound of percepts and affects. The work of art is a 
being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself. (Deleuze 1991/1994: 
163-164)
The aesthetic composition wrests free, or isolates, “a bloc of sen-
sation” independent from the subjective lifeworld, because it can be 
referred back only to a material structure in paint, canvas, or stone, 
etc. At the same time, however, the material structure of the work of 
art does not represent or refer to anything else than what is expressed 
through it, namely, the forces of sensation. This is why Deleuze ar-
gued that the work of art exposes sensation as a relation of external 
forces immanent to its own production. 
We paint, sculpt, compose, and write with sensations. As percepts, sensations 
are not perceptions referring to an object (reference): if they resemble some-
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thing it is with a resemblance produced with their own methods; and the 
smile on the canvas is made solely with colors, lines, shadows, and light. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1991/1994: 166)
It is in this sense that art can be considered a return to a more primi-
tive level of sensation and, as such, the creation of the sensible or 
what can be sensed. From this point of view, art can be considered a 
non-human expression beyond lived experience immanent to the pro-
duction of subjectivity. As a being of sensation that exists in itself, art 
exposes us to relations of force outside our subjective being which at 
the same time become immanent as a genetic force of our subjective 
lifeworld. Contrary to psychological and phenomenological descrip-
tions of the function of art as a reflection or re-presentation of a deep-
er meaning, emotion, identity, or essence of human nature, art is a 
composition of pure sensations. “We are not in the world, we become 
with the world” (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/1994: 169). 
      Because the production of sensations goes beyond any re-
presentation or organization of already given conditions, there is no 
such thing as a theory or system of art in Deleuze. As Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari expressed in Milles Plateaux (1980), “In no way do we 
believe in a fine-arts system; we believe in very diverse problems 
whose solutions are found in heterogeneous arts” (1980/1987: 300). 
The work of art faces problems immanent to its own materials and 
techniques in producing and presenting sensations. In other words, art 
cannot be subjugated to a philosophical concept or a scientific func-
tion.
      For this reason, Deleuze considered artworks to be singular and 
his philosophy does not present a thinking about art, but is rather an 
effort to think with art. This is not to say that Deleuze believed that art 
solves philosophical problems (i.e., that it creates concepts), but since 
the principles for the composition of the work of art are the same as 
the genetic principles for the sensation it presents, works of art be-
come that which call for the creation of concepts that correspond to 
the sensations presented. What interested Deleuze was not the concept 
of art, which is “a solely nominal concept” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/1987: 301), but instead art as a practical thought which exposes 
us to the question of the origin of the being of the sensible or the con-
ditions for what can be sensed. Just as the genesis of the sublime in 
Kant goes beyond the limits of what can be represented in thought, the 
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encounter of intensive or differential forces in art is what expands the 
limits of what can be sensed.
      What is most interesting in Deleuze’s perspective on art as a pro-
ductive force is that it expands the possibilities of subjectivity. In this 
way, art comprises a process of fundamental learning—a “pedagogy 
of the senses”—immanent to the relation between sensation and 
thought. It is from this perspective that the relations between art and 
subjectivity become an intensely constructive endeavor in Deleuze’s 
engagement with works of art and why he insisted that art is an inte-
gral part of the constitution of a thinking subject, which should en-
courage us to pay attention to art practices. 
5.  Art and the Pedagogy of the Senses 
In his book on Bacon, Deleuze wrote: 
We do not listen closely enough to what painters have to say. They say that 
the painter is already in the canvas, where he or she encounters all the figura-
tive and probabilistic givens that occupy and preoccupy the canvas. An entire 
battle takes place on the canvas between the painter and these givens. 
(1981/2003: 70) 
If Deleuze wanted to listen to Bacon and his work, it is not because he 
was interested in his personal history or psychological profile as a 
means of unraveling an intentionality, meaning, or existential narra-
tive in his paintings. According to Deleuze, the primary “battle” in the 
practice of painting is not a personal inquiry into emotional states or 
an effort toward representing an already felt or perceived state in the 
materials of line and color. Instead, what he found in exemplary form 
in Bacon’s work is an exploration of a practical problem common to 
all art practice, which “is not a matter of reproducing or inventing 
forms, but of capturing forces” (40).
[F]or a sensation to exist, a force must be exerted on a body, on a point of the 
wave. But if force is the condition of sensation, it is nonetheless not the force 
that is sensed, since the sensation “gives” something completely different 
from the forces that condition it. How will sensation be able to sufficiently 
turn in on itself, relax or contract itself, so as to capture these forces, and 
raise itself to its own conditions? It is in this way that music must render 
nonsonorous forces sonorous, and painting must render invisible forces visi-
ble. (1981/2003: 40) 
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From this perspective, the question immanent to painting is expressed 
in Paul Klee’s famous formula “[n]ot to render the visible, but to ren-
der visible” (40). This does not mean that the painter uses his imagina-
tion to invent new forms, colors, or structures. Quite the opposite: 
since the imagined represents the already given subjective ideas of 
what can be painted, these givens must be fought or cleared off in 
order to expose one’s self to new sensations. Like the painter Paul 
Cezanne has suggested, “not a minute of the world passes” that we 
will preserve if we do not “become that minute” (Deleuze and Guat-
tari 1991/1994: 169). This is why the identity of a subject crea-ting or 
experiencing works of art cannot serve as a point of departure or be 
presupposed in an explanation of the composition of sensation in Ba-
con’s paintings. On the contrary: the subjective level of the encounter 
with Bacon’s work is the result of the production or collection of sen-
sations isolated in the material structure. 
      Consequently, the primary condition for the production of a sensa-
tion in the work of art is an escape from, or dissolution of, any given 
subjective identity or organization. For Deleuze, listening to artists or 
engaging with art is an exploration of what forces us to become hu-
man, or subject, to something. What “makes” us subjects “is not a 
sensible being, but the being of the sensible” (Deleuze 1968/2004: 
176). The necessarily destructive or dissolving element in the encoun-
ter with works of art is only effective insofar as it gives rise to a reor-
ganization or production of sensation. To Deleuze, the “good” or ef-
fective work of art is something that “forces us to think” in terms of 
new sensations—to become sensible beings. “Is this not the definition 
of the percept itself—to make perceptible the imperceptible forces that 
populate the world, affect us, and make us become?” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1991/1994: 182). In other words, by going beyond recogni-
tion and representation art becomes an experimental apprenticeship in 
the forces of sensation. 
6.  Bacon and the Body of Sensation 
In the effort to go beyond representation and wrest sensation from any 
given objective or subjective organization, one of the main obstacles 
the painter has to fight is the cliché of the figurative, which subjugates 
the eye to recognition or representation by relating painting to a given 
object as an illustration or subjective narrative. 
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According to Deleuze, modern painting has avoided figurative repre-
sentations in two ways, by going “toward pure form, through abstrac-
tion; or toward the purely figural, through extraction or isolation” 
(Deleuze 1981/2003: 2). While Jackson Pollock’s work can be con-
sidered an exemplary expression of radical abstraction, Deleuze found 
Bacon’s work to be an exemplary expression of isolating what the 
philosopher Jean-François Lyotard has termed the figural (Lyotard  
1971). The figural is what goes beyond the rational representation of 
discourse. In Lyotard’s writings, the figural resembles Freud’s notion 
of the unconscious as a primary process appealing to emotional or 
sensuous experiences beyond the discursive domain of representation. 
However, in contrast to Lyotard, Deleuze did not relate the figural to a 
psychological domain, but rather to the production of percepts and 
affects as a precondition for any emotional or perceptive organization 
of sensations. 
       Taking the figural to mean the domain of pure figure, Deleuze 
went on to describe the battle that unfolds in Bacon’s canvases as a 
neutralization of the primary figuration, which means going beyond 
the identifying relation between a given object or subjective identity 
and the ‘Figure.’2 Bacon’s insistence on the Figure isolated from any 
figurative or narrative association with already given objects or phe-
nomena was what fascinates Deleuze. As Bacon argued, “The story 
that is already being told between one figure and another begins to 
cancel out the possibilities of what can be done with paint alone” 
(Deleuze 1981/2003: 3). By canceling out the structures of already 
established relations or associated narratives and meanings between 
figures, Bacon wanted to explore the pure differential relations of 
force immanent to the composition.
       Contrary to the traditional interpretations of Bacon’s work, which 
generally highlight narrative and existential themes of violence, tor-
ture, and pain, Deleuze found the most important endeavor to be what 
Bacon himself described as “record[ing] the fact” (Deleuze 
1981/2003: 26)—which in Deleuze’s terms becomes an effort to paint 
the pure sensation. Study after Velazquez's Portrait of Pope Innocent 
X is an exemplary case of this. Deleuze extrapolated: 
                                                           
2 To emphasize the contrast to the figurative Deleuze writes Figure with a capital F. 
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When he [Bacon] paints the screaming Pope, there is nothing that might 
cause horror, and the curtain in front of the Pope is not only a way of isolat-
ing him, of shielding him from view; it is rather the way in which the Pope 
himself sees nothing, and screams before the invisible. Thus neutralized, the 
horror is multiplied because it is inferred from the scream, and not the re-
verse. (1981/2003: 27-28) 
What we experience as terrifying in Bacon’s painting of the Pope is 
not a phenomenon or narrative illustration of horror that makes the 
Pope scream, but the isolation of the intensive force—the violence of 
sensation—that produces the scream. As Bacon has suggested, he 
“wanted to paint the scream more than the horror” (27). The isolation 
of the Figure counteracts the re-presentation of violence as figurative 
illustration or narrative scene to make visible the violence of sensation 
in the scream itself. As a result, the portrait renders visible the invisi-
ble forces of the body’s becoming-scream—“The entire body escapes 
through the screaming mouth” (20). Put differently, the body of the 
Pope escapes its representational or illustrative figuration to become 
an intensive Figure of the production of a scream. 
[T]he forces that produce the scream, that convulse the body until they 
emerge at the mouth as a scrubbed zone, must not be confused with the visi-
ble spectacle before which one screams, nor even with the perceptible and 
sensible objects whose action decomposes and recomposes our pain. If we 
scream, it is always as victims of invisible and insensible forces that scram-
ble every spectacle, and that even lie beyond pain and feeling. (1981/2003: 
42-43)
It is not the visible or extensional bodily movement of a scream that is 
explored in Bacon’s work, but the invisible or intensive forces of sen-
sation directly in the material. According to Deleuze, the technique of 
figural isolation in Bacon’s work exposes a direct encounter between 
the material and the conditioning forces of sensation. The job of the 
painter is to make the material pass into sensation. In Bacon’s paint-
ings the Figures are not embedded in landscapes or backgrounds from 
which the form emerges; instead, they are surrounded by uniform and 
motionless fields of color. As non-figurative zones, these fields do not 
relate to the Figures as optical depth or distance, but appear on the 
same plane in an encounter that expresses static or potential violence. 
“It is the confrontation of the Figure and the field, their solitary wres-
tling in a shallow depth, that rips the painting away from all narrative 
but also from all symbolization” (xiv). Isolation is in itself an invisible 
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force that neutralizes or cancels out the visible movements of the fig-
ures, making it possible for Bacon to wrest free, or produce, intensive 
forces of sensation—not as moving bodies, but as movements in the 
bodies, that is, as the intensive condition of movement itself. 
      Bacon’s studies of deformed and twisted bodies do not illustrate 
constrained or forced bodies; instead, “they are the most natural pos-
tures of a body that has been reorganized by the simple force being 
exerted upon it: the desire to sleep, to vomit, to turn over, to remain 
seated as long as possible” (Deleuze 1981/2003: 42). The same ap-
plies to Bacon’s paintings of distorted or agitated faces which do not 
derive their expressions from movement, “but rather from the forces 
of pressure, dilation, contraction, flattening, and elongation that are 
exerted on the immobile head” (41-42). 
      According to Deleuze, Bacon was centrally occupied with the 
problem of expressing the elementary forces directly in the material, 
to make the paint come “across directly on the nervous system” 
(Deleuze 1981/2003: 26). This is not a new problem in the history of 
painting, nor an effort limited to Bacon’s work. 
This is a problem of which painters are very conscious. When pious critics 
criticized Millet [Jean-François Millet, 1814-1875] for painting peasants who 
where carrying an offertory like a sack of potatoes, Millet responded by say-
ing that the weight common to the two objects was more profound than their 
figurative distinction. As a painter, he was striving to paint the force of that 
weight, and not the offertory or the sack of potatoes. And was it not Cé-
zanne’s genius to have subordinated all the techniques of painting to this 
task: rendering visible the folding force of mountains, the germinative force 
of a seed, the thermic force of a landscape, and so on? (1981/2003: 41)
In Bacon’s work the problem of capturing forces becomes a radical 
exploration of the intensive and invisible forces of the body. What 
science might explore as functions of referential relations in a system 
of thermodynamics, Bacon explored through intensive relations of line 
and color as the primary conditions for the pure sensation. In his 
paintings, what is important is not the referential functions of material 
structures or the figures’ representational relations to narratives, but 
rather the expression as a fundamental encounter of differential forc-
es—a static violence of sensation—as the invisible conditions beneath 
the visible organization of the body. This is also why Deleuze insisted 
that what Bacon painted in his portraits were not faces but heads: “For 
the face is a structured, spatial organization that conceals the head, 
Art and Subjectivity in the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze 155
whereas the head is dependent upon the body, even if it is the point of 
the body, its culmination” (15).
      What is exposed beneath the spatial organization of the body in 
Bacon’s paintings is a formless matter of expression or an incorporeal 
event of the body. It is in this sense that Bacon’s work forms a tran-
scendental empiricism revealing sensations that do not represent an 
emotional state or objective reference. “As a spectator, I experience 
the sensation only by entering the painting, by reaching the unity of 
the sensing and the sensed” (Deleuze 1981/2003: 25). By sustaining or 
saving a sensation in the material, the painting comes to express an 
event as an incorporeal effect that forces the body to become. The 
body happens through sensation.
      It is from this perspective that I consider Deleuze’s approach to be 
a remarkable opening toward a new understanding of the relationship 
between subjectivity and art. Rather than representing subjective 
sense-experiences or a pre-existing essence of sensibility, art expands 
our capacity for sensibility through experimentation with intensive 
still-to-be-actualized forces of the body. 
      Much like Maurice Merleau-Ponty compared the body to a work 
of art (Merleau-Ponty 1945/2002: 174), Deleuze suggested in his 
analysis of Bacon’s work that art is a bodily expressiveness, a ‘Being-
in-the-World’. But contrary to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
claim that a bodily, pre-reflective intentionality serves as the organiza-
tional function in sense experience, Deleuze considered the body to be 
an assemblage of differential forces with no primary intentional struc-
ture or natural identity. The subjective or objective organization of a 
body is always the result of an immanent production of differential 
relations. A body of sensation is a body insofar as it encounters other 
bodies as its differential, intensive elements, or relations, of becoming. 
Between two actual bodies or different points of the body something 
undetermined is happening which creates a relation. It is this purely 
relational image of the body that is captured in Deleuze’s immediately 
strange idea of a ‘Body without Organs,’ inspired by a poem by the 
French poet and playwright Antonin Artaud: “The body is the body / 
it is all by itself / and has no need of organs / the body is never an 
organism / organisms are the enemies of the body” (quoted in Deleuze 
and Guattari 1972/1983: 9).
      While Merleau-Ponty described art as “an expression of the con-
crete man” (Merleau-Ponty 1946/1964: 36), capturing the perceived or 
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actual body of intentionality in sense experience, Deleuze saw art as 
the production of a Body without Organs—as a virtual domain freeing 
sensation from the actual or already established organization. Some-
what schematically, the virtual here refers to the transcendental pro-
duction, or creative field, that conditions the domain of the actual 
recognition or identification of what currently is. Virtual does not 
mean unreal or imaginary, but rather relational, in the sense that an 
actual state or organization always presupposes the production of a 
relational possibility. “What we call virtual is not something that lacks 
reality but something that is engaged in the process of actualization” 
(Deleuze 1995/2001: 31). The production of a Body without Organs in 
art is at once a dissolution of the actual understanding of the body, but 
also the virtual engagement of opening or producing new bodily rela-
tions, new ways of becoming, or “new varieties to the world” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1991/1994: 175). In this way, the Body without 
Organs in art is an aesthetic effort to free the concept of the body from 
its own idea, which resembles what his French colleague Michel Fou-
cault has attempted to do from a historical perspective by arguing that 
“the soul is the prison of the body” (Foucault 1975/1977: 30). The 
Body without Organs is at once the dismantling of the self through 
experimentation, and that which forces a production of new possibili-
ties of subjective sensibility; “It is not at all a notion or a concept but a 
practice, a set of practices” (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/1987: 149-
150). To create or find an opening toward forces of sensations still to 
be sensed, the artist must neutralize or overcome the already given 
subjective ideas of sensibility and the bodily habits in the act of paint-
ing. Deleuze described this as “a preparatory work that belongs to 
painting fully, and yet precedes the act of painting” (1981/2003: 70). 
Every painter has his own way of facing this invisible battle, but in 
Bacon it is captured in a practice of making random or involuntary 
marks, scrubbing or wiping the canvas or simply throwing paint. “It is 
as if, in the midst of the figurative and probabilistic givens, a catastro-
phe overcame the canvas” (71). This catastrophe overcoming the can-
vas is not only a dissolution or destruction of the given subjective 
ideas of the painter, it is also the emergence of another world in the 
material—a body of sensation escaping the constraints of objective or 
subjective representation. It is through experimentation with these 
non-representative or non-illustrative traits that the painter composes 
sensations beyond what is given in subjective experience. In this way, 
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according to Deleuze, Bacon’s compositions expose a sensibility of 
the eye beyond the visual domain: “It is a violent chaos in relation to 
figurative givens, but it is a germ of rhythm in relation to the new 
order in painting” (72). Rhythm is more profound than vision, hearing, 
etc., because it is a transcendent force immanent to the exercise of the 
faculties. “Rhythm appears as music when it invests the auditory lev-
el, and as painting when it invests the visual” (30). By relating the 
Figures to a rhythm, Bacon’s paintings go beyond the visual domain 
of painting and are no longer just a question of seeing, but also of 
tasting, hearing, or feeling with the eye. 
      To subjective sensibility, then, what is encountered in Bacon’s 
paintings, according to Deleuze, are not qualities or recognizable ob-
jects remembered, felt, or imagined, but that which can only be sensed 
as a limit of the organized body, forcing the emergence of a new do-
main. At the limit, the body is both subject and object and it is the 
same body that gives and receives sensation, forcing an immanent 
production of sensation. “[I]t is inside the body that something is hap-
pening: the body is the source of movement. This is no longer a prob-
lem of place, but rather of the event” (Deleuze 1994/1998: 11).
In line with Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal return, the problem that 
artists like Bacon grapple with is one of how to sustain the intensity of 
becoming as an immanent force in being.  
That the present moment is not a moment of being or of present “in the strict 
sense”, that it is the passing moment, forces us to think of becoming, but to 
think of it precisely as what could not have started, and cannot finish, becom-
ing. (Deleuze 1962/1983: 48)
This is why Deleuze determined the body of sensation as a problem of 
understanding an event. The body of sensation is an event of that 
which can only be sensed; an event that forces the body beyond what 
can be remembered or imagined (i.e., beyond common sense). The 
Body without Organs does not mean or signify anything, but is creat-
ed or laid out as an assemblage of points of immanent difference, a 
“something happening” or a sign that “perplexes the soul” and forces 
us to think. Many have interpreted this element of Deleuze’s thought 
as a call for radical dissolution of our organized self and subjectivity. 
However, as Deleuze pointed out, “Dismantling the organism has 
never meant killing yourself, but rather opening the body to connec-
tions that presuppose an entire assemblage” (1980/1987: 160). What 
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Deleuze’s engagement with art calls for is not a rejection or denial of 
subjective thought, but rather an experimentation with the relational 
forces external to the actualization of subjective thought. 
      In this perspective, the relationship between subjectivity and art in 
Deleuze’s writings is closely related to what Nietzsche once described 
as an endeavor to stop dragging the past through the future in order 
“to become who we are” (Nietzsche 1887/2001: 189). From this exis-
tential point of view, I find that Deleuze’s description of the construc-
tive relationship between subjectivity and art comes across most viv-
idly in his idea of art as a fundamental process of learning. 
7.  Proust and the Apprenticeship of Signs 
From the aesthetic perspective of Deleuze’s transcendental empiri-
cism, learning is not defined in terms of knowledge or the possession 
of truth, but rather as the encounter with a problem that raises a facul-
ty to the level of its transcendent exercise, i.e., going beyond recogni-
tion and representation. “Learning takes place not in the relation be-
tween a representation and an action (reproduction of the Same) but in 
the relation between a sign and a response (encounter with the Other)” 
(Deleuze 1968/2004: 25). 
      A sign should here be understood in terms of Deleuze’s theory of 
sensation, as a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force, 
rather than as an appearance or apparition of a given phenomenon. 
The subjective meaning of a sign is never given, but always the result 
of an encounter between forces external to the idea of subjectivity. A 
sign is a sign because we do not know the meaning of it. For this rea-
son, Deleuze’s question is not what a sign is, but rather how it is used, 
discovered, or interpreted. Consequently, Deleuze rejected the idea of 
a method for learning, but found the source of learning in a “violent 
training” through fundamental encounters with differential forces 
immanent to thought. With regards to sensibility, the apprentice “at-
tempts to give birth to that second power which grasps that which 
only can be sensed” (Deleuze 1968/2004: 205).
     It is particularly in relation to the work of Proust that Deleuze un-
folds the idea of a learning relationship in the engagement with art. In 
his book Proust et les Signes, Deleuze wrote: 
A work of art is worth more than a philosophical work; for what is enveloped 
in the sign is more profound than all the explicit significations. What does 
violence to us is richer than all the fruits of our goodwill or of our conscious 
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work, and more important than thought is “what is food for thought.” 
(1964/2000: 30) 
According to Deleuze, the central theme in Proust’s monumental 
work, À la recherche du temps perdu (1913-1927), is the narrator’s 
exploration of signs as a fundamental apprenticeship involved in be-
coming an artist. Contrary to traditional interpretations, Deleuze did 
not find the unity of À la recherche du temps perdu to be an examina-
tion of memory, but rather a “search for truth.” This search does in-
clude explorations of memories, but only as part of the narrator Mar-
cel’s apprenticeship of deciphering involuntary pluralistic signs. 
Learning is essentially concerned with signs. Signs are the object of a tem-
poral apprenticeship, not of an abstract knowledge. To learn is first of all to 
consider a substance, an object, a being as if it emitted signs to be deci-
phered, interpreted. There is no apprentice who is not “the Egyptologist” of 
something. One becomes a carpenter only by becoming sensitive to the signs 
of wood, a physician by becoming sensitive to the signs of disease. 
(1964/2000: 4) 
In À la recherche du temps perdu the narrator is affected by signs that 
compel him to seek their meaning beyond their immediate appear-
ance. On the one hand, the signs are only there because the narrator 
attends to them; on the other hand, the reason why he attends to them 
is that they overwhelm him with feelings that compel him to explore 
what they mean. In Deleuze’s analysis, the narrator explores four dif-
ferent worlds of signs, which correspond to different structures of 
time. What unifies the different worlds or structures is their formation 
of systems or collections of signs with intersecting persons, objects, 
and substances. However, even though the sign systems are unified by 
these signs, “a man can be skillful at deciphering the signs of one 
realm but remain a fool in every other case... we discover no truth, we 
learn nothing except by deciphering and interpreting” (5). Since the 
plurality of worlds is such that the signs do not appear in the same 
manner and do not have the same relation to their meaning, Deleuze 
asserted that signs are both unifying and pluralistic in the production 
of truth and meaning. Thus, the truth of the sign is beyond signifi-
cance. The sign is the external force immanent to the production of 
meaning and truth. It does not signify an already established or stable 
truth in the world, but it is rather the essence that calls for the produc-
tion of different worlds. The essential aspect of the search for truth 
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does not reside in the involuntary memories, but rather in the learning 
process that they give rise to: “What is important is that the hero does 
not know certain things at the start, gradually learns them, and finally 
receives an ultimate revelation” (3-4).
      What the narrator comes to learn in À la recherche du temps perdu
is that sensuous signs already refer to an ideal essence of sensation 
incarnated in the material meaning, which is only revealed in the de-
materialized or virtual world of art. In this way, Deleuze argued, À la 
recherche du temps perdu explores or produces different structures of 
time, corresponding to the different world of signs. In opposition to 
the dogmatic image of thought represented by common sense, what 
forces the narrator to think or search for the truth are not natural or 
voluntary acts, but the events of involuntary sensuous signs that com-
pel him to decipher or unfold their meaning.
     The involuntary memories in Proust’s work should not, according 
to Deleuze, be understood as an exposition of reminiscence or of actu-
al events of the past, but rather as a composition of virtual events that 
force on us a sensibility for that which happens—events that force us 
to become sensitive or open to different worlds of signs. The event “is 
always and at the same time something which has just happened and 
something about to happen; never something which is happening” 
(Deleuze 1969/2004: 73). The event should not be understood as the 
active synthesis of present moments exercised by our faculties, but as 
the passive synthesis of time which is the primary condition for a con-
templative mind; “our expectation that “it” will continue, that one or 
two elements will appear after the other, thereby assuring the perpetu-
ation of our case” (Deleuze 1968/2004: 94-95). 
      Consequently, the ideal essence of sensuous signs in À la recher-
che du temps perdu expresses a creative composition of events, which 
folds differential forces of time into being and gives rise to a sensibil-
ity for a world of signs. 
To be sensitive to signs, to consider the world as an object to be deciphered, 
is doubtless a gift. But this gift risks remaining buried in us if we do not 
make the necessary encounters, and these encounters would remain ineffec-
tive if we failed to overcome certain stock notions. (Deleuze 1964/2000: 27) 
In my view, the understanding of art as an apprenticeship of signs 
uncovers an existential side to Deleuze’s writings that is often over-
looked. The description of the relationship between subjectivity and 
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art as being “sensitive to signs” might even reveal a normative pre-
scription or ethical imperative to be drawn from art.
8.  Becoming Worthy of the Event 
The normative force of being sensitive to signs is transcendental inso-
far as sensuous signs do not depend on a subjective or objective being, 
and empirical insofar as signs or sensations are pluralistic. 
      To be sensitive to signs or open to new varieties of the world is 
what Deleuze considered an affirmation of the infinite pluralism of ‘a
life’—not the individual, or lived, life dependent on a being, but life 
as the absolute immanent power “carrying with it the events or singu-
larities that are merely actualized in subjects and objects” (Deleuze 
1995/2001: 28). In his essay, L’immanence: Une Vie (1995), Deleuze 
illustrated his image of a life with reference to a scene in Charles 
Dickens’ Our Mutual Friend (1864-1865), in which a disreputable 
man is brought back to life. Those who eagerly try to save him turn 
cold once he is brought back to his mean and crude self. What they 
respond to and want to save is not the individual life of a man held in 
contempt, nor life in general, but the pre-individual power of a life.
Between his life and his death, there is a moment that is only that of a life 
playing with death. The life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and 
yet singular life that releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal 
and external life, that is, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what hap-
pens. (Deleuze 1995/2001: 28) 
It is this impersonal, infinite force of a life within the event that the 
artist responds to or saves in the act of creation, and which is actual-
ized in the spectator as perceptions and affections. As Deleuze argued, 
“Art wants to create the finite that restores the infinite” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1991/1994: 197). Though empirically no general rules can be 
given for these acts of affirmation, the will to free the forces of life 
imprisoned within its actual organization reveals a normative element, 
or willing, in art practice. 
      Although Deleuze never dedicated much of his writing specifical-
ly to the question of ethics, in his book, Logique du Sens (1969), he 
related his ideas of the ‘event’ to an element of Stoic ethics expressed 
in the work of the French poet Joe Bousquet, exploring the bodily 
wounds he incurred as a soldier in the First World War.
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He apprehends the wound that he bears deep within his body in its eternal 
truth as a pure event. To the extent that events are actualized in us, they wait 
for us and invite us in. They signal us: “My wound existed before me, I was 
born to embody it.” (Deleuze 1969/2004: 169) 
To Deleuze, Bousquet’s work expresses an exemplary case of willing 
the event, as such. To will the event is not to resign and accept what 
occurs (e.g., war or wounds), but rather to will something yet-to-come 
inside the event: “the purely expressed” (170). Instead of grasping the 
external wound inflicted on him by the war as an unjust or unwarrant-
ed incident, Bousquet apprehended it as a necessary event making it 
possible for him to become what he already was through his writing. It 
is in this sense that there is an ethics of the event or the purely ex-
pressed in the genetic relationship between art and subjectivity. ”Ei-
ther ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has noth-
ing else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us” (169). To 
become worthy of what happens to us is to affirm the impersonal 
force of a life that does not refer to or represent any given subjective 
or objective moral principles. The ethical principle of the relationship 
of fundamental learning between art and subjectivity can be described 
as an affirmation of the existential grip that sensations or signs can 
have on us. To become sensitive to the chaotic multiplicity of sensu-
ous signs through art imposes on us an ethical call for a creation or 
production of meaning and signification that is immanent to what 
happens. The work of art does not represent something outside its 
material structure, but is rather a production immanent to its own be-
ing as a sensation. In this perspective, becoming worthy of the event 
primarily implies not to do violence to the forces of sensation that 
happen to us. Instead, art must appropriate the external forces that are 
immanent to what happens to us. As described in Deleuze’s analysis 
of Bacon’s work, this is a challenging task that requires a battle 
against the presupposed figurative or narrative structures of our world. 
      In my view, Deleuze’s critique of the traditional aesthetic dualism 
originating with Kant not only paves the way for a non-representa-
tional understanding of art as a production at the center of thought; it 
also provides valuable insight into the existential grip that art and the 
world of sensations have on us. Rather than becoming imprisoned, 
victimized, or categorized by what happens to us, we can operate with 
the event and make it something else by releasing the pure expressive 
force within it. This is what painters like Bacon do by exploring the 
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expressive force of bodily movements beyond figurative representa-
tion, and what writers like Proust do by exploring the forces of time 
beyond the signs of memory. What Deleuze’s reference to Bousquet’s 
work illustrates is that art is a means of attaining the will that events 
create in us. It is not a question of creating or representing events that 
have happened or are happening in our lives, but rather an issue of 
becoming the quasi-cause or operator of the impersonal pre-individual 
effects of life as it happens to us. 
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